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UNITED STATES V. LARA—
FEDERAL POWERS COUCHED IN TERMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
AND A RELAXATION OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
DAVID P. WEBER*

“[T]he tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns,
and our federal Indian† law cases untenably hold
both positions simultaneously.”1
Imagine the following scenario: a non-Indian resident of Minnesota, a
member of the Cherokee tribe residing in Oklahoma, who is visiting South
Dakota for the first time, and a member of the Oglala Sioux tribe are
traveling together through the Oglala member’s reservation in South
Dakota. There they find themselves in an encounter with federal officers.
The situation quickly escalates, and ultimately the three passengers trade
blows with the federal officers.
Under these facts, the Oglala member would be subject to the
jurisdiction of his tribe as well as to the jurisdiction of the U.S. government
and can be tried by both under the doctrine of dual sovereignty.2 The nonIndian Minnesotan is not subject to tribal jurisdiction and will only be
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government. Interestingly, the
resident of the state of Oklahoma, who is also classified as an Indian, is
subject to both the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and the Oglala tribal
government as a result of this classification. He is subject to the tribal
jurisdiction not because he is a member of that tribe, or lives in that area, or
has contacts with the forum, but solely because he is a member of an Indian
tribe by birth.3

*
David P. Weber is an attorney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He would like to give special
thanks to NMW, IMW, and GMW.
†
Author’s note: Throughout this article the term “Indian” is used in reference to American
Indians. The term is used solely to avoid any undue confusion due to the fact that case law and
legislation in this subject area utilize the term Indian exclusively when referring to American
Indians.
1. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128-39 (1959).
3. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 193-94 (recognizing the “inherent power” of a tribe to prosecute
nonmember Indians).
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Part I of this article will briefly review the traditional constitutional
role of Congress in negotiations with American Indian tribes, its plenary
powers, and the treaty powers. It will examine the Supreme Court’s early
decisions regarding Indian tribes as well as its decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,4 U.S. v. Wheeler,5 and Duro v. Reina6 and the
theories of sovereignty that the Supreme Court used in deciding those cases.
Part II will look at the legislation that gave rise to the potentially problematic issues involving tribal jurisdiction, 25 U.S.C. § 1301,7 and at the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Enas,8 as well as the competing
decision United States v. Lara9 handed down by the Eighth Circuit. It will
address the decision by the Ninth Circuit and analyze the difficulties with
its arguments as pointed out by district courts within that circuit. Additionally, this part will analyze the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301 and its premise that the decision in Duro was constitutional. Part III
will provide an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 7-2 decision in United
States v. Lara,10 which reversed the Eighth Circuit.11 It will evaluate
Justice Breyer’s majority decision and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lara, and point out potential issues in the premises employed in arriving at
those decisions. It will also examine Justice Thomas’s concurrence and
evaluate whether or not the concurrence should have come out differently
under his analysis.12 Finally, it will look at Justice Souter’s dissent and the
Eighth Circuit’s en banc decision in Lara and argue that the Supreme Court
incorrectly decided Lara. Part IV will attempt to provide two possible, and
substantially different solutions to the problem. This article will conclude
that the Supreme Court’s decision further clouded the issue of tribal
sovereignty vis-à-vis congressional authority to act in Indian affairs, and it
will provide a simple solution to the constitutional underpinnings present
that the Court could have utilized in Lara.

4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
5. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
6. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2007).
8. 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).
9. 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003).
10. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
11. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
12. Id. at 1641-48.
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TRADITIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS AND INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND EARLY JURISPRUDENCE
REGARDING INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall
have the authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.13 This
clause has often been cited as the source of Congress’s plenary power to
deal with the Indian nations.14 If Congress does indeed have plenary power
to regulate the Indian tribes, then 25 U.S.C. § 1301 is a valid exercise of
that power. Interestingly, however, the Framers’ intent may not have been
for Congress to act in this fashion.15 Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President shall have the authority, by and with the
consent of the Senate to enter into treaties.16 Further, the United States’
dealings with the Indian tribes were generally formalized through the treaty
process until 1871.17
The premise that Congress has plenary power to act with regard to the
Indian tribes presents two troublesome issues. First, why did the executive
branch choose to act in a manner that, at least implicitly, conferred sovereign status on Indian tribes when they were defined separately from foreign
nations in the Constitution? Second, why did Congress then feel the need
to, after having acquiesced in this approach and commissioned groups to
negotiate treaty rights, pass a law explicitly affirming a supposed constitutional right?18 Case law in this subject matter, as noted by Justice Thomas

13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). From the framing of the Constitution, the U.S.
government had already decided to treat Indian tribes different than foreign nations, and thus not
as traditional sovereigns.
14. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627,
655 (2006) (noting, however, that this “Indian Commerce Clause” is limited to the governance of
commerce without more).
15. See Vine Deloria, Jr., “Congress in its Wisdom”: The Course of Indian Legislation, in
THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S, 106-08 (Sandra
L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984). Until about 1850, Congress had not even begun to
assume a more active role. Id. at 106. Indeed, the U.S. government’s actions with the U.S. Indian
tribes had largely been in the form of treaties. Id. at 106-07.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17. See Deloria, supra note 15, at 106-07.
18. See 16 Stat. 544, 544 (1871). Curiously, this bill declared that no tribe would thereafter
be recognized as capable of making treaties with the United States, but that existing treaties would
be honored. Id. at 570. The bill is superfluous if Indian nations are exclusively within the province of congressional authority. Deloria, supra note 15, at 107. The fact that existing treaties
would be honored may not have been even necessary, and was not completely accurate as over
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in Lara,19 is full of conflicting logic as the courts found themselves forced
to decide between competing theories of sovereignty espoused by the same
government.
One of the most famous statements of the era, and perhaps of all U.S.
jurisprudence concerning Indian tribes, fittingly comes from Chief Justice
John Marshall when he declared that the tribes are “domestic dependent
nations.”20 Marshall’s decisions in the Cherokee Nation case as well as in
Johnson v. M’Intosh21 and Worcester v. Georgia22 provided the foundation
for all future jurisprudence regarding Indian sovereignty.23
There are three basic principles that underlie these three temporary
close yet contradictory cases: (1) Indian tribes possess certain elements of
preexisting sovereignty due to their occupation of the land and selfgovernance that predated the Constitution;24 (2) even though they possessed
some type of sovereignty, it was subject to control and/or restrictions or
elimination by the federal government, but not by the states;25 and, (3) the
tribes’ limited inherent sovereignty and their “domestic dependent” status

100 agreements with Indian tribes were made after the act, and “the congressional attitude was
that treaties could be violated at whim because Congress in its wisdom would act in the best
interest of Indians.” Id.
19. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-15 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas noted:
[M]uch of the confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely
incompatible and doubtful assumptions. First, Congress (rather than some other part
of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without
rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 47 (1831). Essentially Marshall invented the
“trust” relationship and said that the U.S. government is to protect the tribes from interference and
intrusion from state governments and citizens. Id. It was in reply to this decision that President
Jackson supposedly quipped: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!”
DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 365 (1949).
21. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). Marshall held that Indian tribes could not convey land to private
parties without the consent of the federal government. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 603-05.
22. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). This case essentially held that the state of Georgia had no authority
over the Indian Territory located within its boundaries, and further that states cannot tax Indians
residing in Indian Territory. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-61.
23. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 627; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
24. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61 (1832) (concluding that a weaker power does not
relinquish its sovereignty solely due to the fact that it has agreed to the protection of a more
powerful nation).
25. See id. at 561. “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.” Id.
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on the federal government imposed on the U.S. government a trust
responsibility.26
Especially interesting is that, although criminal jurisdiction remained
with the Indian tribes for some time,27 the passage of the Major Crimes Act
by Congress in 1885 removed all doubt as to the extent of the jurisdiction of
the federal government on Indian reservations.28 Prior to the enactment of
the Major Crimes Act, one case in particular propelled Congress to revisit
its authority in the criminal arena in the Indian territories.29 In Ex Parte
Crow Dog,30 federal agents sought to prosecute a Sioux Indian, Crow Dog,
for the murder of another, even though he had already been found guilty in
a tribal proceeding.31 The federal authorities pursued this federal prosecution even while believing that they lacked such authority.32 The Supreme
Court granted Crow Dog’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that extending jurisdiction “would be to reverse in this instance the general
policy of the government toward the Indians, as declared in many statutes
and treaties, and recognized in many decisions of this court, from the
beginning to the present time.”33 In its conclusion, the court noted that to
allow the granting of federal jurisdiction in the case would “require[] a clear
expression of the intention of Congress, . . . [which] we have not been able
to find.”34

26. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11-12. See generally AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK (3d ed. 2004) (providing a comprehensive analysis of developments in the field of
Indian law).
27. See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (holding that the ability of the
tribe to deal with certain criminal offenses was an attribute of tribal sovereignty that had not been
restricted by an act of Congress).
28. See Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1135 (2000)).
29. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559-60. Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux band of the
Sioux nation, murdered a fellow tribe member. Id. He was tried and found guilty in a customary
tribal proceeding following the offense. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and
Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 801 (2006).
30. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
31. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. See Washburn, supra note 29 at 801 (noting that Crow Dog
and his family paid to the victim’s family $600 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket—an amount
which would have represented “a small fortune at the time”).
32. Id. at 800 (citing Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of
Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 202-03, 223 (1989)) (discussing how the federal
authorities were determined to proceed with the prosecution, and the prosecution of other Indians,
even without the authority to do so, until finally being admonished by the Secretary of Interior to
adhere to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crow Dog).
33. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572.
34. Id.
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Congress did not delay its response, and enacted the Major Crimes Act
soon thereafter.35 The Department of the Interior lobbied for new legislation to allow punishment for major crimes, claiming that tribal law and
sanctions provided insufficient remedies.36 Congress agreed with the
Department of Interior and passed the Major Crimes Act which acted as a
swift and authoritative overruling of the holding in Ex Parte Crow Dog, and
further demonstrated Congress’s absolute power and authority to restrict
and regulate the Indian tribes.37
Yet, even though many decisions had concluded that Congress had
plenary power,38 the crux of the question the Supreme Court is still trying to
solve today is whether tribes have inherent powers of sovereignty that
predate the Constitution, or whether they only have those attributes of
sovereignty that Congress has delegated to them.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURT’S ANSWER TO SOVEREIGNTY IN
LATER CASES—OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE AND
UNITED STATES V. WHEELER
Two of the most important cases regarding the constitutional and
sovereign status of Indian tribes were decided within three weeks of each
other in 1978.39 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe40 decided the issue of
whether or not Indians had territorial jurisdiction over crimes on
reservations, whereas United States v. Wheeler 41 decided the issue of
whether or not tribal jurisdiction was a delegation of power from the federal
35. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2000)).
36. Id.; see also Washburn, supra note 29, at 803 (noting that the Secretary of the Interior, in
a report to Congress in 1884, falsely portrayed Indian Country as a “lawless place” where the
inhabitants were “the next of kin was duty-bound to avenge murder”). The Secretary also argued
that, lacking any intervention by Congress to extend jurisdiction, no court system would have the
authority to hear any similar case. Id. at 803. A claim which was patently false as Crow Dog had
been tried and convicted by in a tribal proceeding. Id.
37. Washburn, supra note 29, at 803-04. Coming shortly after the decision in Crow Dog,
Congress filled any potential vacuum regarding the tribes’ authority to provide criminal
punishment for specific offenses. Id.; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)
(“The plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a ‘guardianward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”). See generally Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 333, 344 (2004).
38. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that Congress has “plenary
and exclusive” authority to legislate in Indian affairs); Morton, 417 U.S. at 551-52; United States
v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006).
39. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978) (noting that the case was
decided on March 6, 1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 313 (1978) (noting that the
case was decided on March 22, 1978).
40. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
41. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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government.42 Though both cases were decided by the same members of
the Court within a three-week period, the cases present striking differences.
1.

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe

Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court in Oliphant,
delved deeply into the historical circumstances of the Port Madison
reservation on which the Suquamish Indian Tribe resides.43 The Court
noted that the Tribe had placed notices at the entrances to the reservation
that stated that entry onto the Reservation by any person would be deemed
implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the Suquamish Tribal
Court.44 In this case, two non-Indians were arrested on the Port Madison
reservation, and arraigned before the tribal court.45
The Tribe argued that its jurisdiction flowed from the “Tribe’s retained
inherent powers of government over the Port Madison Indian Reservation.”46 The Ninth Circuit decided this case in favor of the Tribe, and stated
that criminal jurisdiction occasioned by offenses committed on the reservation, other than those that are assumed by the federal government, is a sine
qua non of its powers.47 The Supreme Court reversed and held that an
Indian tribe may not assume criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without
the express permission of Congress.48

42. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.
43. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 192-93. It is important to note that this case involves the
distinction solely between non-Indians and Indians and the language of the case so follows. This
case was decided when the majority of the Indian reservation was owned by non-Indians (sixtythree percent) and the two groups were in constant contact. DAVID EUGENE WILKINS, AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THE MAKING OF JUSTICE 187 (1997).
44. Id. at 193-94 n.2. The idea of territorial/personal jurisdiction which the tribe tried to
extend has been the basis of criminal jurisdiction in the United States from its inception, and is the
most common way that jurisdiction is obtained. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877)
(holding that physical presence in the forum, for however brief a time, is sufficient to grant that
forum jurisdiction over the individual).
45. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. Mark David Oliphant was charged with assaulting a tribal
officer and resisting arrest. Id. Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested after an alleged high-speed race
along reservation highways that ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal police vehicle. Id.
Belgarde was charged with “recklessly endangering another person.” Id.
46. Id. at 196.
47. Id.; Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012-14 (1976). Indeed, at the time of this case,
thirty-three of the 127 reservation court systems claimed to extend their jurisdiction over nonIndians, and twelve others had ordinances which would permit the assumption of such jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.
48. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. In footnote 8, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the tribes
were indeed granted jurisdiction over non-Indians in some treaties in the case of non-Indians
entering Indian land without the consent of the federal government. Id. at 197-98 n.8. Justice
Rehnquist concludes, however, that “[f]ar from representing a recognition of any inherent Indian
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . these provisions were instead intended as a means of
discouraging non-Indian settlements on Indian territory . . . .” Id. at 198 n.8. Thus, even when the
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The Oliphant Court examined the history of the issue, and stated that,
beginning with the passage of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790,
Congress assumed federal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against
Indians.49 The Court also examined the Major Crimes Act of 1885, and
stated that it was enacted to place Indian offenders under the jurisdiction of
federal courts when certain major offenses are committed.50 The Court
explained that one of its primary worries in the Oliphant case was that, “[i]f
tribal courts may try non-Indians, . . . those tribal courts are free to try nonIndians even for such major offenses as Congress may well have given the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members of their own tribe
committing the exact same offenses.”51
The Court correctly noted that Congress cannot have intended to give
Indian tribes jurisdiction for violent crimes over non-Indians when they
clearly lack that jurisdiction over their own members.52 The Court then
stated that the Suquamish, in their treaty with the United States, “in all
probability recogniz[ed] that the United States would arrest and try nonIndian intruders” on their reservation.53 The Court read the treaty provision
in conjunction with the law that extended federal enclave law to non-Indian
offenses and stated that this “implies” that the Suquamish are to promptly
turn over any non-Indian offenders to the United States.54 In drafting the
treaty, Commissioners of the Bureau of Indian Affairs rejected treaty language that specified that the United States would retain criminal jurisdiction
in favor of language that did not address the issue.55 The Court stated that
“it seems probable” that the Commissioners simply preferred such language, and that it “could well have been understood” as acknowledging that
the federal government had exclusive criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.56
Court was faced with evidence of expressly granted jurisdiction, the Court held that no such
jurisdiction existed. Id. at 198-99 n.8.
49. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 138 (1790). In 1817, Congress extended
federal enclave law to Indian territory. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201.
50. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
51. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 207 n.16.
56. Id. (emphasis added). The Court proffers this analysis and then notes ironically in a
footnote that:
In interpreting Indian treaties and statutes, “[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation,
dependent upon its protection and good faith.” But treaty and statutory provisions
which are not clear on their face may “be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history.”
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Regardless of any ambiguity, the Court held that absent affirmative
delegation of such by power by Congress, Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court concluded, as all history and
precedent dictated, that “[w]hile Congress never expressly forbade Indian
tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express
our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently
believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”57
Though the holding in Oliphant did not raise many eyebrows, the Court
provided a valuable insight when it adopted the Ninth Circuit’s summation
of the state of Indian sovereignty:58 “Indian tribes are prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly
terminated by Congress and those powers “inconsistent with their status.”59
This last clause came to have constitutional importance in the Duro case.60
2.

United States v. Wheeler

Wheeler decided the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment’s double
jeopardy clause barred the prosecution of an Indian in federal court under
the Major Crimes Act when he had previously been convicted in a tribal
court of a lesser included offense arising out of the same conduct.61 Thus,
the essential question in Wheeler was whether tribal courts receive their
authority from the federal government. If they do, the subsequent prosecution would be barred by the double jeopardy clause as a second prosecution
by the same sovereign.62 If not, case law is clear that the theory of dual
sovereignty provides that a federal prosecution does not bar a future
prosecution by a separate sovereign (usually a state) for the same acts.63

Id. at 208 n.17 (internal citations omitted). The Court concluded that the surrounding
circumstances and legislative history were dispositive.
57. Id. at 204.
58. Id. at 208.
59. Id. at 221 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)).
60. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1989).
61. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 314 (1978). The defendant Indian was arrested
and convicted of disorderly conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Id. at 314-15.
He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen days in jail or a fine of $30 on the first charge and to
sixty days in jail or a fine of $120 on the second. Id. at 315. A year later the federal government
charged the defendant with statutory rape with a possible penalty of fifteen years imprisonment.
Id. at 315 n.3.
62. Id. at 318-19.
63. Id. at 318-20. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-24 (1959). The logic
underlying this assumption is that an offense is a violation of a law. Separate sovereigns may
each classify a certain act as an offense under their law. Therefore, one act results in two distinct
offenses. However, in a relationship such as a city-state or territory-federal government, the city
and territory are both acting as agents of the sovereign and therefore a prosecution in one, bars a
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The Ninth Circuit held that the concept of dual sovereignty should not
apply to this case because “Indian tribes are not themselves sovereigns, but
derive their power to punish crimes from the Federal Government.”64 The
Court reversed and stated that the dispositive issue was the “ultimate source
of the power under which the respective prosecutions were undertaken.”65
The Court framed the issue as to whether the ability to punish tribal
offenders was an inherent part of tribal sovereignty or whether Congress
had delegated this power to the tribes.66
Though Indian tribes no longer possess the full attributes of sovereignty, the Court noted that their powers are “inherent powers . . . which
ha[ve] never been extinguished.”67 Whatever sovereignty remains, it is of a
“unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance.”68 The Navajo Tribe never gave up
the authority to punish tribal offenders, and subsequent federal statutes have
recognized that Indian tribes have jurisdiction over their own members. 69
Finally, the Court noted that the power of a tribe to prosecute its own members was not part of the sovereignty lost implicitly when Indians gave up
their independent status.70 The Court, therefore, stated that it is “undisputed” that Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their own members
and that, “[t]heir right of internal self-government includes the right to
prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to enforce those laws by
criminal sanctions.”71
In answering the question presented by Wheeler, the Court held that
any power which had not been expressly restricted by the federal

further prosecution by the same sovereign. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), Ltd., 302
U.S. 253, 264-68 (1937).
64. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 319.
65. Id. at 320. The Court extensively analyzed the analogies drawn between cities and states
as well as those between the federal government and territories. Id. at 320-22. The Court
concluded that both cities and states act as the agent of their respective sovereign and their power
is derived exclusively from those sovereigns. Id. at 321-22.
66. Id. at 322.
67. Id. at 323 (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945))
(emphasis omitted).
68. Id. at 323. (emphasis added). The Court also noted that until Congress acts, expressly or
by implication, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. Id.
69. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324; see Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 138; Act of
Mar. 3, 1817, § 2, 3 Stat. 383.
70. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326. It is interesting to note that the Court, three weeks after its
decision in Oliphant described its holding as saying that Indian tribes “cannot try nonmembers in
tribal courts.” Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 322 (emphasis added). It is important to take notice, though future cases make the
argument that this is not so, that the Court decided this case as the right of the tribe to regulate its
own members. Id. The entire opinion consistently distinguished only the ability of a tribe to
regulate its members versus any authority to regulate all other third parties. Id.
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government arose solely from the tribes’ inherent sovereignty, and was not
a delegation of power from the federal government.72 Thus, Wheeler concluded that the Tribes had sovereign authority for some criminal prosecutions. “The power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by Tribe
members . . . has never been taken away . . . .”73
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted, “we do not mean to
imply that a tribe which was deprived of [a sovereign power] by statute or
treaty and then regained it by Act of Congress would necessarily be an arm
of the Federal Government. That interesting question is not before us, and
we express no opinion thereon.”74 That question would be partly resolved
twelve years later in Duro v. Reina.75
C. DURO V. REINA—THE LIMITS OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided the interesting question that
Justice Stewart declined to address in Wheeler.76 The defendant, a member
of a different tribe, was charged with the illegal firing of a weapon on the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Reservation.77 From the outset of the
decision, the Court held that “retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political
and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the
authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own
membership.”78
In analyzing the issue of whether tribes have criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, the Court noted that several issues had been raised in the
courts below, most importantly, the violation of equal protection based on
racial classification.79 The district court initially held that the assertion of
tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember would violate the equal protection

72. Id. at 328. In reaching this conclusion, and allowing subsequent prosecution of the
defendant by the tribal court, the Court delineated powers that were implicitly lost when Indian
tribes became dependents of the United States. Id. at 326. Most important to this article, one of
the powers that was lost was the freedom to determine external relations; a Tribe is only allowed
to govern the relations among members of the tribe. Id.
73. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 328 n.28. This issue is essentially the one that the Court faced in Duro as well as in
the title case of this article.
75. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
76. Duro, 495 U.S. at 685-86.
77. Id. at 679-81. The defendant was initially charged with murder and aiding and abetting
murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, but the federal indictment was later dismissed by the
United States Attorney. Id.
78. Id. at 679.
79. Id. at 683; see Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1143-45 (1987).
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guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.80 The court of appeals
rejected this argument when it found “no racial classification in subjecting
petitioner to tribal jurisdiction that could not be asserted over a nonIndian.”81 The Supreme Court reversed the decision.82
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, framed the question as
“whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes in their dependent status
within our scheme of government includes the power of criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers.”83 The Court stated that the rationale in
Oliphant and Wheeler, as well as subsequent case law, compelled the
conclusion that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. 84
The Court found the language in Wheeler that differentiated between member and nonmember to be controlling.85 Further, it concluded that a basic
attribute of sovereignty is the right to regulate those who enter the
sovereign’s territory.86
Oliphant recognized that the tribes are not sovereigns in regard to
territorial jurisdiction, and Wheeler held that the retained sovereignty of the
tribes is “that needed to control their own internal relations and to preserve
their own unique customs and social order.”87 The Court noted, “[t]he
areas in which . . . implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have

80. Duro, 495 U.S. at 683; see 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2007). The district court looked at the
situation and held that subjecting a nonmember Indian to tribal jurisdiction would constitute
discrimination based on race. Duro, 851 F.2d at 1144-45. The court noted that both non-Indians
and nonmembers have neither the right to participate in the tribal government, nor a lesser fear of
discrimination in a court system that bars the participation of their peers. Id. at 1145.
81. Duro, 495 U.S. at 683. Interestingly, the court of appeals rested this conclusion on the
fact that the defendant had significant contacts with the Pima-Maricopa community. Duro, 851
F.2d at 1144. Such contacts included residing with a tribal member and working for a tribal
company. Id. However, it appears that a contacts-based test such as the one utilized by the Ninth
Circuit would not have been considered sufficient to grant the Tribe jurisdiction over a nonIndian.
82. Duro, 495 U.S. at 698.
83. Id. at 684.
84. Id. at 684-85.
Our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler provide the analytic framework for resolution
of this dispute. Oliphant established that the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes
does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the
reservation. Wheeler reaffirmed the longstanding recognition of tribal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by tribe members. The case before us is at the intersection of
these two precedents, for here the defendant is an Indian, but not a member of the
Tribe that asserts jurisdiction.
Id. at 684.
85. Id. at 685-86.
86. Id. at 685.
87. Id. at 685-86. The Court went on to note that the “power of a tribe to prescribe and
enforce rules of conduct for its own members ‘does not fall within that part of sovereignty which
the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status.’” Id. at 686 (quoting United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)) (emphasis added).
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occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe.”88 Further, the dependent status of Indian tribes is
inconsistent with any attempt to independently determine their external
relations.
In resolving the issue at hand, the Court recognized that the defendant’s
relationship to this Tribe was similar to the non-Indian’s relation in
Oliphant, and as such, it was subject to the same limitations.89 The Court
correctly noted that evidence preventing criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers was not overwhelming, but opinions by the solicitors of the
Department of the Interior, as well as past case law, favor the holding that
tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over members only.90 On the issue
of equal protection guarantees, the Court was reluctant to “single out
another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies
that do not include them . . . [and] no delegation of authority to a tribe has
to date included the power to punish nonmembers in tribal court.”91
The Duro Court concluded that the logic and precedent that prevented
jurisdiction over non-Indians, who share the same characteristic as nonmembers, required a holding that tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction
over nonmembers as well.92 In its summation, the Court held that it could
not accept the arguments in favor of “finding tribal jurisdiction that is
inconsistent with precedent, history, and the equal treatment of Native
American citizens.”93 That concluding statement would have been sufficient to decide future cases on the same matter had Congress not attempted
to intervene and legislatively overrule Duro.

88. Id. at 686 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 695 (“[T]ribes are not mere fungible groups of homogenous persons among
whom any Indian would feel at home.”).
90. See 1 Op. Sol. 699 (1936) (“Inherent rights of self government may be invoked to justify
punishment of members of the tribe but not of non members.”); 1 Op. Sol. 849 (1938) (mentioning
only adoption of nonmembers into the tribe or receipt of delegated authority as means of acquiring
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians). See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-27.
91. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 696. The Ninth Circuit and Justice Brennan, in dissent, made the argument that
prohibiting jurisdiction in this case would create a jurisdictional void because no sovereign would
have the power to try the defendant for the crime charged. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 704-06
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1145-46 (1987). That argument is
somewhat disingenuous because the federal government did initially charge the defendant with
murder and with aiding and abetting murder, crimes encompassed by the Major Crimes Act, and
Arizona only lacked authority because it had specifically disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian
Country Crimes. Id. at 696-98.
93. Duro, 495 U.S. at 698.
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II. UNITED STATES V. ENAS AND UNITED STATES V. LARA—
DELEGATION VERSUS RELAXATION AND WHY THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
Enas and Lara deal with the same factual situation. A nonmember
Indian is tried for a criminal offense by the tribe, and then subsequently
tried by the federal government. This type of prosecution, which was
prohibited in Duro, received new life shortly thereafter. In 1990, Congress
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).94 Previously, the ICRA
defined tribal “powers of self-government” as “all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all
offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed,
including courts of Indian offenses.”95 The 1990 amendments changed the
definition to include [the] means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”96
Essentially, Congress legislatively attempted to rewrite the history of
Indian sovereignty that the Supreme Court had recently penned, and,
surprisingly to some, it succeeded.
A. UNITED STATES V. ENAS—THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF
AMENDED § 1301(2)
In Enas, the defendant, a member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, was
charged, convicted, and sentenced for assault with a deadly weapon and
assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury in the tribal court of the
White Mountain Apache Tribe.97 The defendant was then indicted in
federal district court.98 The district court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, holding that it was a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 99
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard this case to identify the “ultimate
source of the power under which the respective prosecution[] [was]
undertaken.”100
The Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in
Duro, and summarized the Supreme Court’s conclusion as being “that the
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (providing the definition of “powers of selfgovernment”).
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2001).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 666 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)).

2007]

FEDERAL POWERS COUCHED IN TERMS OF SOVEREIGNTY

749

tribes’ inherent authority never included [the power to prosecute nonmembers.]”101 The Ninth Circuit also added an aside from the American
Indian Law Review: “Everyone assumes Congress could have created new
law by delegating federal power to tribes to try nonmember Indians. . . .
[But,] if the delegatee has no power in a particular area, the delegatee
exercises the power of the person doing the delegation.”102 Though these
two arguments appear straightforward, the Ninth Circuit framed the
question at hand as to whether Congress had the authority to rewrite
history.103 Congress was sure to make clear in the legislative history of the
ICRA amendments that these “amendments were not a congressional
delegation of authority, but rather a recognition of power that always
existed.”104
The Ninth Circuit had previously examined this issue in Means v.
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.105 In Means, the court stated that
Congress was without the authority to rewrite history in this fashion—
Congress, intended the 1990 amendments “to ‘legislatively overrule’ the
Supreme Court’s decision.”106 But, Congress could not do so:
While the legislative history of [the 1990 amendments] suggests
that Congress did not intend to delegate . . . to the tribes [the
authority to prosecute nonmember Indians], that is essentially the
amendments’ effect. While Congress is always free to amend laws
it believes the Supreme Court has misinterpreted, it cannot
somehow erase the fact that the Court did interpret the prior law.
In other words, once the Supreme Court has ruled that the law is
“X,” Congress can come back and say, “no, the law is ‘Y,’” but it
cannot say that the law was never “X” or always “Y.” . . . Thus,
regardless of Congress’ intent to declare that tribes always had the

101. Id. at 668.
102. Id. at 667 (quoting Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v.
Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 112 (1992)).
103. Enas, 255 F.3d at 670; see also United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F 3d 818, 823 (8th
Cir. 1998). “[W]e are presented with a legislative enactment purporting to recast history in a
manner that alters the Supreme Court’s stated understanding of the organizing principles by which
the Indian tribes were incorporated into our constitutional system of government.” Id.
104. Enas, 255 F.3d at 669. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H2988-02 (daily ed. May 14, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Miller) (“This bill recognizes an inherent tribal right which always existed. It
is not a delegation of authority but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly taken
away.) It is plain that Congress wanted to make clear that the tribes had jurisdiction over
nonmembers. Id. However, Congress also wanted to allow separate prosecutions of the same
persons for the same acts, and it knew it could not do so if that authority was a delegation of
power to the tribes from itself. Id.
105. 154 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
106. Means, 154 F.3d at 946.
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inherent authority to try nonmember Indians, that simply cannot be
what the amendments accomplished.107
With these arguments in hand, it appeared that the Ninth Circuit would
adopt the logical premises of Means and Duro and rule that the Indian tribes
did not have inherent sovereignty over nonmembers, and therefore the new
power was a delegation of congressional authority. That did not happen.108
The Ninth Circuit stated that Duro was based on federal common
law,109 and did not rest on any constitutional principles.110 As such, the
court of appeals held that Congress is the final arbiter of federal common
law, and Congress’s power in that realm is supreme.111 Though the Ninth
Circuit permitted Congress’s revised history, it did not place much credence
in its own arguments.112 Additionally, Means is overruled only in a footnote, and only partially.113 Therefore the Ninth Circuit rejected the holdings of Duro and Means, but noted, “[w]ere this an issue of constitutional
history, the outcome would be different.”114 As the Enas court was
unwilling to go that far, Congress’s new and reinterpreted history of Indian
sovereignty became the law of the land in the Ninth Circuit.

107. Id.
108. See generally Enas, 255 F.3d at 675.
109. Federal common law is court made law that is neither constitutional nor statutory. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 349 (3d ed., 1999).
110. Enas, 255 F.3d at 674.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that this question presents a simple answer. On
the contrary, “history” falls outside of the usual litany of authorities controlled by
designated branches of government. It is neither “constitution” nor “statute,” and can
only roughly be labeled “federal common law.” This rough fit is, however, the best
one.
Id.
111. Id. at 675.
112. See id. at 675. The Ninth Circuit devoted less than one page of its analysis to the issue
of federal common law and Congressional authority. The entire discussion of federal common
law and the role of Congress is confined to a single paragraph that ultimately decides the case.
The issue that arose in Duro and Means, whether equal protection guarantees are violated when a
nonmember is subjected to tribal jurisdiction, was not raised. Id. at 675 n.8. In its final footnote
the Ninth Circuit makes clear that this issue was not raised in the present case, and the outcome
might have been different if it had. Id.
113. Id. (overruling Means only to the extent that it held that Congress did not have the
authority to reinterpret federal common law).
114. Id. at 675 (noting that Congress does not have the authority to “override a constitutional
decision by simply rewriting the history upon which it is based”).
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B. UNITED STATES V. LARA—THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S RULING THAT
HISTORY CANNOT BE REWRITTEN
Following the decision in Enas, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
examined a nearly identical set of facts and yielded a different outcome. 115
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the holdings of Oliphant, Wheeler, Duro, and
Montana v. United States116 and quickly framed the issue similar to the
Ninth Circuit, as to whether the tribal court “exercised sovereign authority
emanating from a sovereign source distinct from that of the overriding
federal sovereign.”117 The Eighth Circuit also noted that in response to
Duro, Congress had amended the ICRA to its current broad definition.118
Whereas the Ninth Circuit permitted Congress to rewrite history to suit its
legislative needs, the Eighth Circuit did not. The Eighth Circuit held that
Duro was a constitutional decision:
With all due respect to the holding in Enas, we conclude that the
distinction between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately
entrusted to the Supreme Court. Absent a delegation from Congress, a tribe’s powers are those “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” Once the federal
sovereign divests a tribe of a particular power, it is no longer an
inherent power and it may only be restored by delegation of
Congress’s power.119
The Eighth Circuit noted that Congress’s power over Indian affairs is
derived from and limited by the Constitution.120 Then, the Eighth Circuit
did what the Ninth Circuit had decided against, and declared that Duro’s
115. See United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The
defendant struck a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer while being arrested on the Spirit Lake Nation
Reservation of which he was not a member. Id. at 636. He plead guilty to tribal code violations
that included violence to a policeman. Id. The defendant was also indicted for assault on a
federal officer and argued against that indictment on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
116. In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court again emphasized the distinction between the sovereignty of a tribe over members versus nonmembers, and that all tribal sovereignty
over external relations, i.e., nonmembers, had been necessarily divested from the tribes. 450 U.S.
544, 563-64 (1981) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
117. Montana, 450 U.S. at 637.
118. Id. at 638. The Eighth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, after the ICRA amendments, had “repeatedly reaffirmed its holding limiting tribal sovereign authority to tribe
members.” Id.; see, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649 (2001) (rejecting the imposition of a hotel occupancy tax on a nonmember owned hotel within the reservation
owned in fee by nonmembers); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (citing Oliphant for
the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of a tribe do not extend beyond
regulation of their members).
119. Lara, 324 F.3d at 639 (internal citations omitted).
120. Id.
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decision regarding Indian sovereignty in the U.S. federal system of
government was a decision for the courts, and that after Montana, “tribal
sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive without express congressional delegation,’ and is therefore not inherent.”121
The Eighth Circuit echoed the argument first put forth in Means and
detailed fully in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Enas, that Congress cannot
retroactively legislate a reversal of Duro. The Eighth Circuit did not declare the ICRA amendments to be null, but correctly noted that Congress
has plenary powers in this field, and that “[i]t is apparent that Congress
wished to allow tribes to exercise criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.”122 However, the Eighth Circuit was not willing to
concede this grant of power without cost, as the Ninth Circuit had. The
Eighth Circuit declared that the Tribe exercised only that authority that had
“been delegated to it by Congress.”123 Therefore, the subsequent federal
prosecution of the defendant was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.124
The decision by the Eighth Circuit in Lara reached what logically
appears to be the correct result, but the lack of support for its argument that
Duro is a constitutional decision is troublesome. Perhaps the principal
reason that the Supreme Court in Lara adopted the result in Enas, was this
lack of constitutional foundation. This lack of constitutional support exists
partly because the results in Duro and subsequent case law were clear on
the issue that the power of tribes over nonmembers was not inherent and did
not exist neither did it provide a greater depth of analysis.
III. UNITED STATES V. LARA—ALLOWING A RELAXATION OF A
PRIOR RESTRICTION OVER TRIBAL AUTHORITY
A. MAJORITY OPINION BY JUSTICE BREYER
Justice Breyer framed the question as “whether Congress ha[d] the
constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political branches
ha[d] . . . placed on the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.”125
121. Id. at 640 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. As a result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lara, the equal protection violation
did not need to be argued. Under this result, the current racial classification that would be
presented and allowed in the hypothetical situation presented in the Introduction to this article
would be prohibited without more.
125. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). This question could likewise be
framed as follows without losing any significance in its practical application: Does Congress have
the constitutional authority to re-grant powers to Tribes that have previously been eliminated or
restricted by the federal government? The rephrased question is essentially the same in terms of
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The Court referenced to Wheeler and Duro and then focused on the fact that
Congress amended the ICRA shortly after Duro was decided.126 The Court
believed the amendment to the ICRA did “not purport to delegate the
Federal Government’s own federal power. Rather, [the amendment] enlarges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’ to include ‘the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.”127
The Court, similar to the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, framed the question as whether the source of the tribes’ power to punish nonmember
Indians was inherent federal sovereignty or delegated federal authority.128
The Court then noted that Congress probably intended for the latter.129 The
language of both the amended version of 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) and its
legislative history leave no doubt that Congress intended the tribe to have
inherent tribal power over nonmember Indians.130
The Court put forth six arguments as to why the Constitution permits
Congress to lift the restriction on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Thus, the Court is able to bypass the question of whether
the source of tribal power in criminal matters is sovereign or delegated.
The Court’s arguments, in order, are the following: (1) the Constitution
grants plenary powers to Congress to legislate in respect to Indian tribes;131
(2) Congress has, with the Supreme Court’s approval, interpreted the Constitution’s “plenary” grant of power over Indian affairs as enabling it to enact legislation that restricts and relaxes restrictions on tribal sovereignty;132
(3) “Congress’ statutory goal—to modify the degree of autonomy enjoyed
by a dependent sovereign that is not a State—is not an unusual legislative
practical application, yet opposite to what Justice Breyer posited. This difference in construction
is ultimately the dispositive issue in the case.
126. Id. at 197-98.
127. Id. at 198 (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 199.
129. Id. Obviously both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are in complete agreement. Were it
otherwise there would have been absolutely no discussion of Congress’s attempt to rewrite history
through a legislative act.
130. See supra note 104; 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000). The statute’s legislative history is a
record of Senators and Representatives providing their intentions with the Act, stating that the
“premise [of the legislation] is that the Congress affirms the inherent jurisdiction of tribal
governments.” 137 CONG. REC. S. 5223 (1991) (statement of Sen. Inouye) (emphasis added). The
“statute is not a delegation of authority but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly
taken away.” 137 CONG. REC. at 10712-714 (statement of Rep. Miller, House manager of bill).
131. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203.
132. Id. at 202; see Government-to-Government Relations With Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,951 (May 4, 1994). Congressional policy has ranged from
favoring Indian removal, to assimilation, to the breaking-up of tribal lands, to the protection of the
tribal land base. F. COHEN HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-202 (1982) (detailing the
progress of federal policy with native American tribal governments).
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objective;”133 (4) there is “no explicit language in the Constitution suggesting a limitation on Congress’ institutional authority to relax restrictions
on tribal sovereignty previously imposed by the political branches;”134 (5)
the change at issue is a limited one; 135 and, (6) the conclusion that Congress
has the power to relax previously imposed restrictions is consistent with
prior case law.136
Justice Breyer, writing for the 7-2 majority noted:
True, the Court held in . . . [Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro] that the
power to prosecute nonmembers was an aspect of the tribes’
external relations and hence part of the tribal sovereignty that was
divested by treaties and by Congress. But these holdings reflect
the Court’s view of the tribes’ retained sovereign status as of the
time the Court made them. They did not set forth constitutional
limits that prohibit Congress from changing the relevant legal
circumstances, i.e., from taking actions that modify or adjust the
tribes’ status.137
The Lara Court specifically noted that the Duro Court drew upon a variety
of different sources in arriving at its holding.138 The Lara Court “referred
to historic practices, the views of experts, the experience of forerunners of
modern tribal courts, and the published opinions of the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior.”139 The Court stated, however, that the decisions in Wheeler, Oliphant, and Duro were based on the inherent tribal
authority as it existed at the time the Court made its decision, and that such
authority was subject to change.140
The Court then stated that prior cases “simply did not consider whether
a statute, like the present one, could constitutionally achieve the same end
by removing restrictions on the tribes’ inherent authority.”141 In this manner, the Court avoided the question of whether or not a “relaxation of a
restriction” previously imposed upon a sovereign power is equivalent to a

133. Lara, 541 U.S. at 203.
134. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
135. Id. The Court noted that this change largely concerns a tribe’s authority to control
events that occur upon the tribe’s own land. Id. However, this is precisely what the Court and
Congress have disavowed with regard to non-Indians and nonmembers. Lara, therefore, effectively allows race-based territorial jurisdiction.
136. Id. at 205.
137. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 206.
139. Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 689-92 (1990)).
140. Id. at 206-07.
141. Id. at 207.
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new “delegation” to exercise that power.142 The Court held that Wheeler,
Oliphant, and Duro were not determinative because the amendment to the
ICRA relaxed restrictions which changed the calculus of what inherent
sovereignty tribes possessed.143 “And that fact makes all the difference.”144
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE LIMITED TO THE FACTS AT
HAND
The crux of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was that “Congress was
careful to rely on the theory of inherent sovereignty, and not on a delegation. [The dissent’s] position that it was a delegation nonetheless, . . . is by
no means without support, but I would take Congress at its word. . . . That
is all we need say to resolve this case.”145 However, Justice Kennedy went
on to note that “[i]t is a most troubling proposition to say that Congress can
relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in a way that extends
that sovereignty beyond those historical limits.”146 Essentially, Congress
did that with the 2000 revision to the ICRA.
Again, Justice Kennedy noted the language being employed in the
Court’s opinion, and stated that “[t]he Court resolves, or perhaps avoids,
the basic question of the power of the Government to yield authority inside
the domestic borders . . . by using the euphemistic formulation that in
amending the ICRA Congress merely relaxed restrictions on the tribes.”147
For all intents and purposes, thus far Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reads
much more like a dissenting opinion.148 Justice Kennedy concluded that if
the defendant truly wanted to challenge Congress’s actions in this case, the

142. Id. The Court, in passing on the question, noted that “we do not read any of the . . .
[specific cases referring to the need to obtain a congressional statute that “delegated” power to the
tribes] as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian
law through this kind of legislation.” Id. By construing the amendment as a “change” rather than
specifically a delegation of new authority or a relaxation of a prior restraint, the Court is able to
proceed without more.
143. Id.
144. Id. Unlike Enas, the defendant in Lara did raise the equal protection claim. Id. at 209.
However, the Court stated that such a claim is irrelevant to the double jeopardy claim at hand, and
refused to address it. Id.
145. Id. at 211. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that Justice Kennedy would be the one to
make this statement as he was the author of the opinion that caused Congress to further amend the
ICRA. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
146. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212.
147. Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 211. Justice Kennedy notes “[t]he Court’s holding is on a point of major significance to our understanding and interpretation of the Constitution; and, in my respectful view, it is
most doubtful.” Id. Justice Kennedy also stated that he is clearly aware of what Congress was
attempting and noted “it should not be doubted that what Congress has attempted to do is subject
American citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional sovereign to which they had not
previously been subject.” Id. at 213.
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proper place would have been in tribal court.149 By the time the second
proceeding was brought by the federal government, “whether legitimate or
not,” the rationale behind the tribal court’s actions was inherent sovereignty, and therefore there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.150
Justice Kennedy provided some insight of what may come if a similar
case were to be challenged at an earlier stage. An uncomfortable Justice
Kennedy noted that the decision of the Court rests upon the phrasing of
Congress’s grant of power, and he noted that the Court is “trying to evade
the important structural question by relying on the verbal formula of relaxation.”151 Though Justice Kennedy formally concurred in Lara, his opinion
and analysis suggest that future challengers to the ICRA amendments may
reach a different outcome.
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas wrote separately to specifically comment on the
Court’s “inadequate constitutional analysis.”152 Justice Thomas did not
agree that Congress had the authority to revise the limits on Indian sovereignty whenever it saw fit.153 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas noted a
problem in Supreme Court case law that has been stated often and never
resolved, “[i]n my view, the tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns,
and our federal Indian law cases untenably hold both positions simultaneously.”154
Justice Thomas took a strong position on the Court’s theory of Indian
sovereignty, and stated that a sovereign is an entity “in which independent
and supreme authority is vested.”155 He further noted that such a statement
is logically at complete odds with Congress’s plenary powers over the
tribes.156 However, as those are exactly the two positions espoused by the
United States, “this confusion continues to infuse federal Indian law and

149. Id. at 214. “The proper occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe’s authority, that is,
whether Congress had the power to do what it sought to do, was in the first, tribal proceeding.”
Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 213.
152. Id. at 215.
153. Id. Justice Thomas noted that there are two largely incompatible assumptions at play in
all of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the Indians tribes, resulting in many poorly written
opinions: (1) “Congress . . . can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering
tribal sovereignty a nullity;” and (2) “the Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty to enforce their
criminal laws against their own members.” Id. at 214-15 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id. at 215.
155. Id. at 218 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (6th ed. 1990)).
156. Id. “It is quite arguable the essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim of an
external government.” Id.
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[the Court’s] cases.”157 Justice Thomas then followed Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence and concluded that both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch believe that the tribes possess inherent authority to prosecute
nonmember Indians.158
In my view these authoritative pronouncements of the political
branches make clear that the exercise of this aspect of sovereignty
is not inconsistent with federal policy and therefore with the
position of the tribes. Thus, while Duro may have been a correct
federal-common-law decision at the time, the political branches
have subsequently made clear that the tribes’ exercise of criminal
jurisdiction against nonmember Indians is consistent with federal
policy. The potential conflicts on which Duro must have been
premised, according to the political branches, do not exist.159
Although Justice Thomas expressed strong reservations regarding the
opinion of the Court, he concluded that the alternative espoused by Justice
Souter was also logically untenable.160 Justice Thomas, struck by the fact
that both Justice Souter and the Eighth Circuit concluded that the decision
in Duro had constitutional underpinnings, would not adopt their reasoning.
He was unwilling to reach the conclusion that prior federal common law
decisions limiting tribes authority to exercise their inherent sovereignty be
construed as a constitutional holding that Congress could not alter.161
Yet, similar to Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas offers a glimpse of the
possibility of change.162 He challenged the Court to admit that it was

157. Id. at 219.
158. Id. at 222.
159. Id. at 222-23 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 223-24.
161. Id. Justice Thomas found equally troubling the fact that the opinion of the Court did not
find any provision of the Constitution that would grant to Congress the authority to alter tribal
sovereignty. Id. at 224. Justice Thomas did not agree that the Indian Commerce Clause provides
plenary powers for Congress to legislate Indian affairs at their whim. Id.
162. Id. at 215-16. Justice Thomas began his concurrence by noting the conflicting
precedent in the area of tribal sovereignty and constitutional law, and stated:
I write separately principally because the Court fails to confront these tensions, a result
that flows from the Court’s inadequate constitutional analysis. I cannot agree with the
Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate
the “metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.” Unlike the Court, I cannot locate such
congressional authority in the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the
Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. at 215 (internal citations omitted). Justice Thomas later stated “I believe that we must examine
more critically our tribal sovereignty case law. Both the Court and the dissent, however, compound the confusion by failing to undertake the necessary rigorous constitutional analysis.” Id. at
223.
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unable to find a source of Congress’s power to alter Indian tribal
sovereignty.163 Such an admission
might allow the Court to ask the logically antecedent question
whether Congress (as opposed to the President) had this
power. . . . We might find that the Federal Government cannot
regulate the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and
simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sovereigns in any
meaningful sense. But until we begin to analyze these questions
honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have identified will
continue to haunt our cases.164
The tone of Justice Thomas’s and Justice Kennedy’s concurrences ring
hollow as being concurrences in name alone. They appear more as concurrences based on the precise facts of this case. As a result of Lara, there
remains a glaring hole in federal Indian case law which could have been
cured while avoiding any issues of the constitutionality of prior federal
common law as noted below.165
D. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENT
Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the
decision of the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed. The dissent’s argument
attempts to logically compel the conclusion the Eighth Circuit reached.166
Justice Souter noted that the holding in Duro was that “because tribes have
lost their inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, any subsequent exercise of such jurisdiction ‘could only have come to the Tribe’ (if at
all) ‘by delegation from Congress.’”167 Precedent clearly indicates that
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers absolutely rests on a delegation of federal power, not a relaxation of a prior restraint on inherent power.
Justice Souter then tried to make clear that the prior case law, deciding
questions of dependent sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause, was “constitutional in nature.”168 The basic question of

163. Id. at 224. “The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives
Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.” Id.
164. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
165. See infra Part IV, pp. 31-38.
166. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 231 (2004).
167. Id. at 227. Three years after Duro, in South Dakota v. Bourland, the Court clarified that
“any such ‘delegation’ would not be a restoration of prior inherent sovereignty; . . . ‘tribal
sovereignty over nonmembers cannot survive without express congressional delegation, and is
therefore not inherent.’” Id. at 227 (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695
(1993)). Bourland was a civil case regarding the regulation of hunting and fishing by non-Indians.
Bourland, 508 U.S. at 681-82.
168. Lara, 541 U.S. at 228-29.
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whether a criminal prosecution was a delegation of federal power “turns on
just this question of how far a prosecuting entity’s inherent jurisdiction
extends.”169 According to Justice Souter, to answer that question, the Court
needed to undertake a constitutional analysis of whether or not an entity is
an independent or dependent sovereign, which it failed to do.170 “Thus, our
application of the doctrines of independent and dependent sovereignty to
Indian tribes in response to a double jeopardy claim must itself have had
constitutional status.”171
The most troublesome aspect of the argument pertaining to the constitutional status of prior cases regarding the sovereignty of Indian tribes,
similar to the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, is that it does not rest on any
specific clause of the Constitution. Essentially, the holding of the Court
was that Congress, as the ultimate arbiter of federal common law, has the
power to amend it.172 In Lara, at both the Eight Circuit and the Supreme
Court level, the reasoning that espoused a constitutional underpinning for
its decision was flawed. Even so, the theory behind those constitutional
arguments, that only law, not history may be amended is sound, and fits
with the facts of the case and prior precedent. Justice Souter’s analysis
deals with the two weakest aspects of the majority opinion in that the result
provided by Justice Souter is both rational (i.e., it would not allow for the
seemingly “unfair” result presented in the hypothetical) and does not give
credence to revisionist history. Further, Justice Souter states that this
federal delegation of authority will fill any jurisdictional gap that may have
been present, as the government argued, when Duro was decided.173
Many would argue that such a conclusion is nothing more than looking
at the ends desired and then justifying the means by which they are obtained. Even so, the Supreme Court in Duro supported this conclusion.174

169. Id. at 229 (citing Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907)).
170. Id. at 229.
When we inquire “whether the two [prosecuting] entities draw their authority to
punish the offender from distinct sources of power,” . . . we are undertaking a constitutional analysis based on legal categories of constitutional dimension (i. e. [sic], is this
entity an independent or dependent sovereign?). Thus, our application of the doctrines
of independent and dependent sovereignty to Indian tribes in response to a double
jeopardy claim must itself have had constitutional status.
Id. (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)). Justice Souter also stated his fear that
the legacy of Lara would cause further confusion in an area of case law already lacking in clarity
due to the Court’s “failure to stand by what . . . [it has] previously said reveals that [its] conceptualizations of sovereignty and dependent sovereignty are largely rhetorical.” Id. at 230.
171. Id. at 229.
172. Id. at 199-210 (explaining the Court’s reasoning).
173. Id. at 223-30.
174. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697-98 (1990).
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The validity of the decision was only questioned when Congress attempted
to reinterpret its policies regarding the sovereignty of the Indian tribes.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
As noted above, there are several problems in both the majority’s and
dissent’s conclusion and analysis. Principally, when does the relaxation of
powers, to the point of actually increasing prior powers, amount to delegation? According to the Court’s opinion in Lara, never. The conclusion that
it compels is that Congress could, tomorrow, amend 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) to
state that Indian tribes never had inherent sovereignty to try nonmember
Indians. Though the declaration would again reverse the “history” of tribal
sovereignty, according to Lara, that would be a legitimate exercise of
congressional power.
With the strength and recentness of past precedent that had held that
any change in the inherent status of tribal sovereignty would necessarily be
a delegation of power, it is remarkable to follow the Court’s reasoning in
reaching its conclusions in Lara. Further, there are racial undertones in a
decision such as this one, even though no racial animosity was intended.175
The Court’s decision ultimately leads to the deeper questions of who is an
Indian and who deserves to be subject to additional prosecution for equivalent conduct as a result of that classification. There does not appear to be
any public policy in favor of granting Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. There are two policy arguments that are generally put forth: (1) such power will increase the strength of tribal sovereignty;
and (2) it will fill a jurisdictional void that left when Duro prohibited tribal
criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed on the reservation by
nonmember Indians.
A relaxation on the restraints on tribal sovereignty does appear to
increase tribes’ inherent jurisdiction.176 In fact, as Lara is written, Congress
can further expand on the tribes’ inherent jurisdiction and still characterize
it as a relaxation. Therefore, due to this relaxation of a prior restriction, the

175. The distinction between an Indian and non-Indian is essentially a racial classification.
The decision in Lara reinforces the importance of race as the dispositive factor in a line of case
law that has long suffered from racial bias. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 674 (noting that no
discussion of the foundation of constitutional law is complete “without a full reckoning of the
racism inherent in the holdings or the racism of the reasoning behind the holdings”). See also
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 14 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I cannot but think
that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet ‘state,’ to a people so low
in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.”) (emphasis added).
176. Ipso facto, by removing a limitation on the scope of tribal jurisdiction, the reach of that
jurisdiction has been increased. See Washburn, supra note 29, at 807, n.158 (recognizing
Congress’s authority to relax prior restrictions on the scope of tribal jurisdiction).
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Indian tribes were indeed granted increased sovereignty. The question of
why Lara is wrongly decided is answered in part by analyzing who bears
the cost of this increased sovereignty. The federal government is not ceding
any authority by allowing the tribes an increased scope of sovereignty, nor
is any of the states. The true bearer of cost of this increased sovereignty
happens to be any person who subjected to the jurisdiction of an Indian
tribe who will, solely because of his or her race, face dual prosecution. In
the initial hypothetical scenario, the Cherokee and the non-Indian deserve
equal punishment as none has a greater degree of culpability. But that will
not be the outcome. Understandably, the Oglala member, being a part of
the tribal community, is subject to its jurisdiction. The Cherokee member,
like the non-Indian, is not a member of that community, however, since
Congress has, as Justice Kennedy noted, affirmatively decided to treat all
Indians as “fungible groups of homogenous persons,” the Cherokee
member will face dual prosecution.177
The second policy argument, that granting Indian tribes criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers will fill the jurisdictional void left by Duro,
lacks merit. Congress is free to fill this jurisdictional void by granting such
power directly to the tribes. However, once that power is delegated to the
tribes, it must be treated as a delegation, and any subsequent federal
prosecution would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
There are at least three potential solutions, unlikely as they may be, to
resolve the existing confusion in tribal sovereignty case law presented by
Lara. The first would be to further expand the scope of tribal jurisdiction to
recognize the fact that tribal governments and legal systems have advanced
greatly and provide competent legal systems. A second possible, though
equally unlikely, solution would be for Congress to amend the ICRA and
explicitly state that the amendment is to be construed as a delegation of new
authority. The final potential solution, which is also the cleanest, easiest to
implement, but most unlikely, would be for the Supreme Court to accept
another case similar to Lara and overrule itself on the basis that history
cannot be amended.
A. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION FOR INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS
If the quality of the tribal court system and processes were proven to be
fair, efficient and effective, territorial jurisdiction could be granted to the
tribal courts for all misdemeanors committed on their territory by both
Indians and non-Indians. This approach could offend non-Indians who do

177. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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not look favorably upon Indians being granted the authority to try nonIndians for a criminal offense, and it could also offend those who believe
that the tribal court systems are too lenient in their sentencing. Indeed,
tribal courts lack the authority to hand out sentences greater than the
maximum currently imposed, which is one year of incarceration, a fine of
$5000, or both.178 Congress sets the maximum which may be modified at
any time. The present limits represent an upward increase from the prior
limits of imprisonment of six months, or a fine of $500 or both.179
The other primary argument against such an expanse of jurisdiction,
essentially, that non-Indians should not be tried by Indian tribal courts, is
functionally and socially different. Though all tribes could certainly do as
the tribes did in Oliphant and post notices that all entering the territory are
subject to their jurisdiction and thereby provide notice of the fact that the
tribes are claiming jurisdiction, the essential objection presented by those
non-Indians who do not wish to face tribal court jurisdiction remains the
same—they refuse to submit to an entity which they do not perceive as a
separate sovereign.
Even though the risk of a sovereign exercising jurisdiction over an
individual by virtue of presence in that territory is, after all, the same risk
one runs by driving through a neighboring state,180 and even though tribal
courts grant procedural protections which are subject to judicial challenge if
insufficient, the fundamental social basis that exists for resisting such a
change is likely to impede any such modification. Regardless of the
strength of any such biases, the fact remains that contact-based jurisdiction
in the Indian tribes’ territories would present the fairest and simplest
solution to the current state of the law under Lara.
B. DELEGATED AUTHORITY RESULTING IN SINGLE PROSECUTIONS
WITH EQUAL PENALTIES
A second, equally unlikely, alternative is for Congress to again amend
the ICRA to state that the prior amendment to the Act was a delegation and
not a relaxation of a prior restraint. As Congress presented testimony, however self-serving, specifically on this issue, it is unlikely that it will revisit

178. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2007).
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2007).
180. See Burham v. Sup. Ct. of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (reaffirming the precedent that “[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present
in the State”).
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the issue.181 Nevertheless, Congress should revisit the issue because the
holding in Lara provides that any future grant of power will be held to be a
relaxation of a prior restraint is illogical and will yield future litigation and
case law on the subject matter. It is imperative for both the Congress and
the courts to speak with one voice on this issue to avoid further confusion
and expense.
Significantly, Congress should declare that the authority over nonmember Indians was indeed a delegation of powers. As a consequence, little
would be lost in the arena of criminal jurisdiction and law enforcement on
the reservation. Furthermore, a racial inequity based on whether or not one
is classified as an Indian would be solved. Fears of the severity or fairness
of sentences could be allayed if Congress would set sentencing guidelines
for tribal courts. By amending § 1301(2) in this way, the result in the
hypothetical presented in Part I would be that the non-Indian and Cherokee
member would be tried in separate forums due to the ICRA’s classification
based on Indian status, but with similar penalties under a sentencing guideline structure that would equate with their degree of culpability. The Oglala
member, as a result of his membership in the tribe, would rightly be the
only individual required to face two separate trials under the theory of dual
sovereignty.
The result, though imperfect due to a continued lumped classification
of Indians, is better than the current situation under Lara. At the very least,
the Oglala member is tried by his peers in a system he understands, in front
of a court system that is not foreign to him. There is not the sense of injustice in the Oglala member being tried twice, due to his membership in the
tribe, as there would be in the Cherokee member being tried twice solely on
the basis of being congressionally classified as an Indian.
The crux of the matter, and the reason the hypothetical stirs emotion, is
the notion of fairness and also the idea that a jury of peers shall try an

181. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (“The Committee of the Conference
notes that . . . this legislation is not a delegation of this jurisdiction but a clarification of the status
of tribes as domestic dependent nations.” (citing e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3-4 (1991) (Conf.
Rep.)); accord H.R. REP. NO. 102-61, at 7 (1991); see also S. REP. NO. 102-168, at 4 (1991)
(“[R]ecogniz[ing] and reaffirm[ing] the inherent authority of tribal governments to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”); 137 CONG. REC. 9445, 9446 (1991) (remarks of Sen.
Inouye) (“[The] premise [of the legislation] is that the Congress affirms the inherent jurisdiction
of tribal governments over nonmember Indians.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 10,712-10,714
(remarks of Rep. Miller, House manager of the bill) (the statute “is not a delegation of authority
but an affirmation that tribes retain all rights not expressly taken away” and the bill “recognizes an
inherent tribal right which always existed”); Id. at 10,713 (remarks of Rep. Richardson, a sponsor
of the amendment) (“[The] legislation . . . reaffirms Indian tribes’ criminal misdemeanor
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. . . .”).
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accused.182 By trying a Cherokee member due to his Indian heritage in the
Oglala system, both the notions of fairness and of a jury trial by peers are
violated. This result should not be the desired outcome of the amendment
to the ICRA, and for these reasons alone the Act should be amended.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS —WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE?
Assuming, arguendo, that Oliphant, Wheeler, and Duro were decided
as federal common law cases, does that necessarily dictate the outcome in
Lara? The answer must be no. As the Court noted, the context of federal
common law is different from both statutory and constitutional interpretation. In this case, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 is important to the decision of the case,
but what the decision ultimately turns on is history.183 As the Lara decision
turns on history, and the Supreme Court passed once on the argument, the
opportunity to implement the final alternative solution may have already
passed.
The Court had it right when it said that Congress can change the
federal common law regulating tribal sovereignty,184 but it should only be
able to change it in most cases. Congress should be able to fix the result in
Duro to permit tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, though
it should properly be classified as a delegation. It should be recognized,
though, that Congress does not have the power to change history, as it was
allowed to do in Lara.185

182. U.S. CONST. amend VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . .”). Though the constitutional protection of a trial by a jury of one’s peers is not
present in the Constitution, the idea has been ingrained in the lexicon of United States legal
opinions. See, e.g., In re Tiffany Green, No. 96-022, 1996 WL 660949, at *1 (E.D.P.A., Nov. 15,
1996) (“The right to a trial by jury of one’s peers is one of the cornerstones of the American
judicial system. It is a birthright cherished by generations of American citizens.”); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt, or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”).
183. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B (noting that the
Eighth Circuit in Lara refused to allow Congress to amend history rather than federal common
law). Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that Congress, having the authority to amend federal
common law, had the authority to do so in a manner that allows them to state that the former law
never was as it was. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 206-07. “[W]e do not read any of these cases as
holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian law
through . . . [the amendment to the ICRA].” Id. at 207.
184. Lara, 541 U.S. at 206-07. The Court recognized in the past that the Supreme Court had
decided cases based on several sources of authority, including specifically, congressional
legislation. Id. at 206. “And that source was subject to change.” Id.
185. Id.
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The Court did not need to base the holdings in past tribal authority
cases on the Constitution, which was a major weakness in the argument of
both the Eighth Circuit, en banc, and Justice Souter.186 Past cases did not
need to be read as immutable constitutional decisions for Lara to be
decided differently. Perhaps the easiest solution, and one which may not be
unavailable, would have been for the Court to hold that history cannot be
revised to meet the current desires of Congress. As stated above, Congress
should have the authority in dealing with the federal common law to say
that the law is X, but it should be logically restrained from having the
authority to say that it was never Y.187
Basing prior case law on history eliminates the need for the Court to
classify Congress’s action as a relaxation of prior restraint instead of a new
delegation of authority. The Court would still have been able to conclude
that Congress is the ultimate authority over federal common law, and the
Court would still have been able to conclude that Congress has plenary
power over the Indian tribes. Instead, the Court leaves us with the decision
in Lara and the certainty that, since almost no uncertainty has been
resolved, we will be seeing similar cases in the future that continue to
struggle with the attempt to balance the sovereignty and dependence of a
people whose authority exists only at the whim of a separate sovereign.

186. See id. at 226-31; United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
187. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

